Sour Faces, Happy Lives? On Laughter, Joy and Happiness of the Agelasts by Kivistö, Sari
 
Heli Tissari, Anne Birgitta Pessi & Mikko Salmela (eds.) 2008
Happiness: Cognition, Experience, Language
Studies across Disciplines in the Humanities and Social Sciences 3.  
Helsinki: Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies. 79–100.
Sour Faces, Happy Lives?
On Laughter, Joy and Happiness of the Agelasts
Sari Kivistö
Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies
During the Renaissance and the early modern period, laughter as a bodily 
phenomenon caused by the jubilant mind became the subject of numerous scientific 
and literary texts. Scholars endeavoured to give detailed physiological descriptions 
of laughter and its immediately observable effects on the human body, especially 
on the face. Laughter was described as a bodily movement that was the result of 
the emotions of joy and happiness. However, early modern texts often also referred 
to ancient philosophers, intellectuals or religious figures who had never laughed 
once in their lives, or who had laughed so much that they had died of laughter. 
This essay explores these agelast and hypergelast figures. If the signs of rejoicing 
and happiness included a drawing back of the lips, what did the grim faces of the 
agelasts mean? Why did they abstain completely from an emotion that, at least 
in theory, was proper to all human beings? By examining selected sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century texts, this essay presents some reasons found for the absence 
of laughter and reminds us of the curious interrelationships between laughter, well-
being and virtuous living in early modern thinking.
During the Renaissance the old doctrine of the four humours, which had been 
based on the ancient notion of the permanent condition of man, began to give way 
to a growing interest in transitory emotions. In this changing atmosphere laughter, 
as a temporary emotional state, fascinated many authors, medical researchers, and 
philosophers.1 Scholars often combined medical observation and psychological 
and cultural interpretation. In sixteenth-century medical treatises, laughter was 
treated as a bodily phenomenon, and medical treatises concerned themselves 
with explaining its physiological mechanics, its causes and the effects discerned 
in the body. Laurent Joubert (1529–1582), a French humanist and medical doctor 
from Montpellier who published an influential French treatise on laughter (Traité 
1 Barasch 1997, 174.
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du ris, 1579), defined laughter as “a movement caused by the jubilant mind and 
the unequal agitation of the heart, which draws back the mouth and the lips.”2 
Joubert’s approach was characteristic of Renaissance science, because he 
combined “a physiological explanation involving the mind’s impact on the body 
[…] and physiognomic symptoms observed in visual experience.”3 As the seat of 
laughter, early modern scholars often preferred the heart, which expanded with 
joy, the expansion first proceeded to the muscles and nerves in the diaphragm and 
then up to the cheeks until the air and spirits were released and expelled through 
the open mouth.
Renaissance treatises on laughter also distinguished its different types: 
joyful laughter, malicious laughter, a smile caused by the perception of beauty, a 
chimpanzee’s smile, loud laughter, laughter caused by tickling, and so on. Joubert 
mentioned that a young man had died when two girls tickled him, but since this 
laughter was caused by touch and purely physical stimuli and not by the movement 
of the sensitive appetites only, it was not true laughter.4 True laughter was often 
seen as the result of the emotions of joy and happiness. In his De anima et vita 
Juan Luis Vives (1492–1540) argued that laughter arises from the emotions of joy 
and delight, and the physician Girolamo Fracastoro (1478–1553) noted in his De 
sympathia et antipathia rerum that laughter signals internal happiness. Joubert also 
claimed that the laughing body manifests great signs of contentment and vehement 
movements that accompany intense and sudden joy.5
Early modern medical authors were interested in laughter, since they saw 
a connection between laughter, happiness and health. According to Joubert, 
sad and unhappy people are never seen laughing, whereas those who have 
no worries and are in good health (children, young people) are quick to laugh.6 
Laughter was more quickly produced when the person was in good condition 
and without worries, but it also had therapeutic effects: it dispelled melancholy, 
abolished distress and helped sick people to recover their health while they were 
watching comic scenes and amusing incidents. By stimulating and relieving the 
2 Joubert 1980, 73; Barasch 1997, 175. On Joubert, see also Link-Heer 1999.
3 Barasch 1997, 175. According to Barasch, the descriptive natural sciences of the Renaissance 
focused on laughter as a visible phenomenon (1997, 174). On laughter and physiology, see also 
Berger 1997, 45–64; cf. Fracastoro 1550, 181.
4 For different kinds of laughter, see Joubert 1980, 74–90. For tickling and laughter, see also 
Aristoteles, De partibus animalium 3, 10.
5 Vives 1959 (1538), 210: Ex laetitia & delectatione risus nascitur; Fracastoro 1550, 181: Laetitia 
interna in facie manifestetur. Cf. Matthaeus 1582, 765: cum gaudii accidens atque symbolum sit 
risus; Puteanus 1612, 778: Risus a gaudio. However, Joubert conceived of laughter as a mixture 
of opposite emotions, joy and sorrow (1980, 43–45). On the view of laughter as an expression of 
contempt, see, e.g., Skinner 2000. 
6 Joubert 1980, 36, 104. 
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mind and by providing recreation and relaxation from work, laughter could also 
lead to happiness and a healthier life.7
In his speech Democritus, sive de risu dissertatio Saturnalis (Democritus, or A 
Saturnalian Dissertation on Laughter), Erycius Puteanus (1574–1646), a Belgian 
humanist and philologist, regarded laughter as an aesthetic and ethical concept, 
which expressed the presence of both beauty and virtue.8 A beautiful face was never 
grim, and laughter and smiles signalled a tranquil mind. Using the conventional 
wisdom of his day, namely, that laughter is a physiological expression of emotion, 
Puteanus also argued that laughter proceeded from joy and gladness (gaudium) 
aroused by pleasant things. The emotions expanded the heart until the whole 
body shook with laughter. Puteanus also noted the close resemblance between 
joy and sadness: laughter could lead to tears. Puteanus defended laughter as an 
instrument of moral improvement and for him laughter signalled a life well lived. He 
viewed joy as the most honest of all emotions, since it filled the mind with feelings 
of tranquillity and security.9
Early modern authors thus often paid attention to the immediately observable 
effects of laughter and joy on the human body. Authors like Joubert focused on the 
laughing face: no animal but man had a face, and as a social animal man “ought not 
to have his affections so hidden that one might not discover them.”10 All the internal 
affections were imprinted in facial expressions; they were difficult to dissimulate, and 
especially vehement emotions were always revealed by some mark or noticeable 
facial change. Joubert emphasised that the face and its discernible emotions were 
also necessary to any social intercourse in order to discover other persons’ manners, 
emotions and nature.11 Signs of rejoicing and happiness included a shining forehead, 
sparkling eyes, reddening cheeks – caused by the great quantity of humours and 
blood that gushes upwards – and a drawing back of the lips.12 However, many early 
modern texts dealing with laughter also mentioned people who had neither laughed 
nor smiled in their entire lifetimes, as well as those who had laughed so much 
that they had made laughter a profession (Democritus) or even died of laughter. 
Early modern ideas of laughter have been studied earlier, but there is no focussed 
discussion of the agelast (non-laughing) and hypergelast (ever-laughing) figures. In 
7 Joubert 1980, 126–127. There is an extensive literature on laughter as recreation and an antidote 
to melancholy. For two good discussions, see Olson 1982; Schmitz 1972.
8 Erycius Puteanus (Erik van der Putte, 1574–1646) succeeded Justus Lipsius as professor at 
Louvain. His speech was delivered at the University of Louvain in 1611 and published in 1612. For 
Puteanus, see also Verberckmoes 2000.
9 Puteanus 1612; Verberckmoes 2000.
10 Joubert 1980, 6; trans. David de Rocher.
11 Joubert 1980, 6–8.
12 Joubert 1980, 40.
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the following essay, I will examine some of these exceptional individuals who were 
dealt with in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century texts on laughter. What kinds of 
people were those who had never laughed? Why did they abstain completely from 
an emotion that, at least in theory, was proper to all human beings?13 And if laughter 
signalled joy and happiness, what did its absence mean?
In order to answer these questions, I will explore selected sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century texts dealing with laughter. Laughter became a popular 
issue, for example, in Quaestiones quodlibeticae, hilarious and free academic 
discussions held yearly in European universities from the early fifteenth century 
onwards. Professors were asked to comment on whatever topic was put before 
them by students, and usually the respondent argued for and against the issue 
under consideration.14 These playful quodlibet texts were then included in larger 
collections, such as Caspar Dornau’s (1577–1631) Amphitheatrum sapientiae 
Socraticae joco-seriae (Amphitheatre of serio-comic Socratic wisdom; first 
published in 1619).15 Dornau’s compilation contains the following short texts on 
laughter: Caspar Diepelius’ Quaestio an ridere liceat (A Question whether laughter 
is permissible; 1582);16 Philipp Matthaeus’ Responsio (Response; 1582);17 Rudolph 
Goclenius’ De Physiologia Risus & Ridiculi, Theses (Theses on the physiology of 
laughter and the ridiculous);18 Johannes Kuhl’s Theses De risu, fletu et locutione 
(Theses on laughter, weeping and locution);19 and Erycius Puteanus’ speech 
Democritus, sive de risu dissertatio Saturnalis (1611). I will take a closer look at 
some of these texts and in addition will refer to some sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century medico-philosophical discussions, Laurent Joubert’s extensive treatise in 
particular, that illuminate the nature of laughter and its relation to the good life.20
13 For the Aristotelian idea of man as the only animal capable of laughing, see Labarrière 2000.
14 Cf. Verberckmoes 2000, 400.
15 Dornau’s compilation includes parodical eulogies and mock-dissertations (written in Latin and 
Greek) that followed the usual forms of encomia or scientific dissertations, but instead of more 
substantial topics they focused on something widely regarded as trivial, unworthy or vile. Laughter 
became one of the issues addressed along with other trivial and emphatically non-serious issues. 
For mock-encomia, see Kivistö 2009; on Dornau, see Seidel 1994.
16 Diepelius was a student from Hessen.
17 Matthaeus (1554–1603) was a professor of rhetoric at the University of Marburg.
18 Goclenius the elder (1547–1628) was a professor at Marburg. His son, Rudolph Goclenius the 
younger (1572–1621), wrote on laughter as well. Dornau’s compilation does not include the whole 
treatise by Goclenius the elder, but only his short theses on laughter.
19 Kuhl was a student at Marburg.
20 This essay focuses on a handful of early modern texts only, but laughter was widely discussed 
in the late sixteenth-century medical, philosophical and rhetorical texts. For further information, see, 
e.g., Skinner 2000. For the art of joking and jesting, see Kivistö 2008.
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The Agelasts – the People Who Never Laughed
In early modern discussions of laughter the idea is often encountered that laughter 
must somehow be justified. Thus, in December 1582 student Caspar Diepelius 
posed the question whether a virtuous and wise human being was allowed to laugh 
(Quaestio an ridere liceat). Diepelius elaborated on the arguments both for and 
against this question. If laughter accompanied shameful and frivolous deeds and 
obscene words, he assumed that it should be forbidden. To support his argument 
against laughter he listed famous men whose names were automatically associated 
with not-laughing and in that sense had become paradigmatic. Other early modern 
authors also provided lists of persons who had remained unmoved and had never 
laughed in their lives:21
Heraclitus: ca. 540–475 BC, the famous weeping philosopher.• 
Anaxagoras: ca. 500–428 BC, a philosopher, astronomer and mathematician • 
from Clazomenae.22
Dionysius: 430–367 BC, a Sicilian tyrant of Syracuse and a playwright who • 
loved tragedy but never watched comedy.
Phocion: ca. 402–318 BC, an Athenian politician, war strategist and • 
adversary of the orator Demosthenes.
Aristoxenus: ca. 370–300 BC, a Peripatetic and Pythagorean philosopher • 
who abhorred laughing.
Parmeniscus of Metapontum: an early Pythagorean philosopher.• 
Cato, M. Porcius: the elder, Cato Maior or Cato the Censor, 234–149 BC, a • 
famous Roman politician and statesman.
Crassus, M. Licinius: an uncle of the more famous first-century BC M. • 
Licinius Crassus, Roman general and politician, who laughed, at most, only 
once in his whole life.
Nerva: Roman Emperor in 96–98 AD, known as the first of the five good • 
emperors, and successor to Domitian.23
Christ.• 
Laurent Joubert also had an entire chapter on people who never or very seldom 
laughed. He included some of the names mentioned above: Phocion, Cato the Censor, 
Crassus, Nerva. In addition, Joubert mentioned Socrates, the Emperor Numerian, 
Philip the Younger, the modest Plato, Lazarus and those who visited Trophonius, the 
21 Diepelius 1582, 764; Puteanus 1612, 778–779.
22 The anecdote that Anaxagoras never laughed or smiled was attributed by Puteanus to Aelian’s 
historical miscellany Varia historia 8, 13. Aelian also mentions Aristoxenus here.
23 The anecdote that Nerva was never seen laughing or playing is attributed by Diepelius and 
Joubert to a first-century Pythagorean philosopher, Apollonius of Tyana, and his work Apology.
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oracle of Jupiter, as men who had never been seen to laugh. In Italy the whole family 
known as the Arisis of Cremona owed their surname to not laughing.24 
Of these men, Phocion was known to have a poker face. The Greek biographer 
Plutarch recorded that Athenians hardly ever saw Phocion either happy or sad, 
in laughter or in tears, and further, that “though his nature was most gentle and 
most kind, his countenance made him seem forbidding and sullen, so that hardly 
any one of those who were not on intimate terms cared to converse with him 
alone.”25 When Phocion was teased because of his frowning brows he answered: 
“No harm […] has come to you from this brow of mine; but these men’s laughter 
has cost the city many a tear.”26 Phocion thus observed that not to laugh was to be 
virtuous in the sense of not hurting anyone; laughter was derision that was to be 
suppressed, because it caused pain to others. This reflects the dominant ancient 
view of laughter, according to which laughter was essentially scornful, directed at 
someone one finds inferior in some way and hence to be controlled.27 In his Life 
of Phocion, Plutarch also pointed out that whereas others wept and shed tears in 
difficult circumstances, the countenance of Phocion was always the same, and his 
calmness and grandeur of spirit were greatly admired by other men.28 
Plutarch is also a source for Anaxagoras, since in his Life of Pericles, Plutarch 
emphasised the philosopher’s great impact on the Athenian statesman’s character. 
Anaxagoras, nicknamed Nous (Mind), was closely imitated by Pericles.29 From 
Anaxagoras, Pericles learned composure of countenance and an undisturbed 
serenity and calmness in all his movements. Similar stories were told of both Cato 
the Censor and Cato Uticensis (95–46 BC), a Roman politician and statesman 
who was known as a firm Stoic and legendary for his severe, stubborn character, 
rigidity and moral integrity. Cato Uticensis never smiled even as a child but looked 
suspiciously at everyone: “It was altogether difficult to make him laugh, although 
once in a while he relaxed his features so far as to smile; and he was not quickly 
nor easily moved to anger, though once angered he was inexorable.”30
24 Joubert 1980, 100–104. François Rabelais also listed agelastoi; see Ménager 1995, 80–81. For 
medieval agelasts (including St. Bernard and Hildegard of Bingen), see Minois 2000, 210–215.
25 Plutarch, Phocion 5, 1; trans. Bernadotte Perrin.
26 Plutarch, Phocion 5, 1; trans. Bernadotte Perrin. Frazier 2000 has pointed out Plutarch’s interest 
in laughter and people who laugh in his Lives.
27 Cf. Plato, Philebus 48–50; Aristotle, Poetics 1449a; Nicomachean ethics 1128a. On laughter 
and (ancient) philosophy, see the articles in Desclos 2000 (on Plato’s Philebus and Aristotle in 
particular); Ménager 1995, 79–116; Sanders 1995, 83–112; Morreall 1987; and Minois 2000, 57–60 
(a brief discussion of the agelast Greek philosophers from Pythagoras to Plato).
28 Plutarch, Phocion 36, 1. See also Valerius Maximus, Facta et dicta memorabilia 3, 8, ext. 2; 
Cornelius Nepos, Phocion.
29 Plutarch, Pericles 4, 4–5, 1.
30 Plutarch, Cato the Younger 1, 2; trans. Bernadotte Perrin.
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Puteanus noted that of these men, Crassus was even nicknamed Agelastus 
(“without laughter”, Gr. gelastós, laughable); the anecdote was attributed to Lucilius 
and repeated in many ancient sources.31 Pliny the Elder mentioned him, for example, 
in his discussion of human curiosities and peculiar attributes given to men:
It is stated that Crassus the grandfather of Crassus who fell in Parthia never laughed, 
and was consequently called Agelastus, and that likewise there have been many 
cases of people who never wept, and that the famous philosopher Socrates always 
wore the same look on his countenance, never gayer and never more perturbed. This 
temperament sometimes develops into a kind of rigidity and a hard, unbending severity 
[torvitas] of nature, and takes away the emotions natural to humanity […].32
Pliny’s passage continues with a list of philosophers who were particularly 
severe by nature, as well as two other curiosities: Pomponius the poet and ex-
consul, who never belched, and Drusus’ daughter Antonia, who never spat.
Puteanus also included Parmeniscus of Metapontum, who lost his ability to laugh 
after descending into the cave of Trophonius to hear an oracle, but recovered it 
again on the island of Delos at the sight of a deformed and ugly statue representing 
the image of the goddess Leto.33 Puteanus further drew attention to people who 
valued laughter even though they were otherwise famous for their restrained, 
exercised and virtuous way of life. The Spartans, for example, who were known for 
their strict seriousness, revered the Goddess of Laughter. Plutarch says that the 
famous Spartan lawgiver Lycurgus dedicated a statue to Laughter and introduced 
into Spartan drinking parties the habit of jesting to sweeten their otherwise austere 
way of life. Puteanus recalled an anecdote about a Spartan soldier with a fly painted 
on his shield, who was mocked as a coward because of this modest signum. He 
responded that he could attack an enemy so rapidly that he would be taken for a fly.34 
It has been argued that laughter and jokes were used to consolidate the social order 
31 See Cicero, De finibus 5, 92; Tusculanae disputationes 3, 31; Ammianus Marcellinus 26, 9, 11; 
Macrobius, Saturnalia 2, 1, 6; and Solinus, De mirabilibus mundi, cap. 1.
32 Pliny, Naturalis historia 7, 79; trans. H. Rackham.
33 This story was told by Athenaeus (614A, according to Puteanus, lib. 14, cap. II); cf. Aristophanes, 
Clouds 508 and Strabo, Geografica 9, 39, 13. See Minois 2000, 19. The phrase “descent to the 
Trophonian cave” became proverbial in the meaning of “to suffer a great fright.” The cave in Boeotia 
was associated with melancholy, because the visitors emerging from the cave after having met the 
oracles and being given revelations always looked pale. It was also said of persons who looked 
serious and grave that they had visited the Trophonian cave.
34 Puteanus 1612, 779; Plutarch, Lycurgus 25, 4. Cf. Joubert 1980, 17; David 1989, 1. At the end of 
Book 2 of his Metamorphoses (celebrating the festival day of the god Risus), Apuleius related that, 
in Thessaly among the Hypatenses, Laughter was also revered as a god. In his short treatise on 
satire, Francesco Robortello (1516–1567) tells of an ancient tribe called Phaestii who, according to 
the testimony of Athenaeus, were educated in joking and jesting from childhood and trained to the 
degree that some of them regarded their unending hilarity as a plague sent by the gods. Therefore, 
they visited the oracle of Apollo in a vain effort to recover their seriousness. Robortello 1548/1970, 
501–502. See also Athenaeus, Deipnosophistes 6, 261c–e.
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in Spartan society and to improve and correct its (militaristic) character. Spartans 
had special laughter contests in which laughter seemed to express the sensation 
of superiority and inculcate the Spartan love of victory. Boys were educated to 
accustom themselves to joking, and the corrective force of laughter was repeatedly 
exercised against those who had somehow failed in society. According to Plutarch, 
to endure jesting and teasing was a peculiarly Spartan quality.35
Early modern authors thus noted that intellectuals, philosophers or well-known 
moral figures influenced by ancient moral teachings comprised a prominent group 
of agelast people. But why did intellectuals abstain from laughing? How was this 
curious quality of theirs connected with their ideas of the good and virtuous life? 
Apparently, the reluctance to laugh did not mean that the men singled out for their 
severity were unable to laugh or to experience positive emotions. Nor were they 
particularly unhappy or insensitive. Rather it was their deliberate choice to refrain 
from laughter. They were admired because they had risen above laughter through 
self-restraint.
Why Did Intellectuals Reject Laughter?
Voluntary abstinence from laughter may be explained by judging the nature of 
laughter. The impulse to laugh was regarded as automatic, unreflective and 
something that appeared without choice or premeditation, unlike, for instance, the 
virtues involving choice. Joubert claimed, quoting Quintilian, that “laughter has an 
extremely great power which cannot be resisted. Most often it slips out of us and 
is not to be contained. It not only forces both the face to confess and the voice to 
declare our feelings, but its violence shakes and sets the whole body in motion 
[…].”36 Laughter was a form of power that made people lose control of their bodies; 
it “burst out”, “was unrestrainable”, “took possession”, “had an imperious force” 
and “broke out against the will”.37 According to Joubert, it was impossible for the 
vehement affections not to be revealed by some change imprinted in the face. 
Laughter caused involuntary physical convulsions in the body which, since the 
convulsions were natural, were sometimes difficult or nearly impossible to hide, 
stop, suppress or control “even with reason ordering it”. At times it was even difficult 
to close the mouth, because it was impossible to quiet the humours that were 
affected in the heart.38
35 David 1989, 3–5.
36 Joubert 1980, 16; trans. David de Rocher; cf. Quintilianus, Institutio oratoria 6, 3, 9.
37 Cf. Cicero, De oratore 2, 235.
38 Joubert 1980, 7, 29, 120.
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If then the heart and the arteries did not obey the will, how was the conduct 
of the agelasts to be explained? Control of bodily movements was not completely 
impossible, as proved by the example of Crassus and others. Although the 
agitation of humours, the shaking of muscles and other first movements taking 
place in laughter were involuntary, in Joubert’s words at times the heart did 
obey the command of reason. Laughter stopped if Reason decided the laughter 
was absurd.39 According to Joubert’s treatise, there were different reasons why 
laughable action did not always produce laughter. For example, if someone falls in 
the mire, we laugh, unless the person hurts himself and some injury, offence or real 
suffering ensues; then we are moved to compassion and stop laughing. Character 
also helps to determine how easily a person is moved to laughter: serious people 
seldom laugh at seeing a human’s rear end or sex organs revealed but find the 
sudden exposure shameful. Or if someone eats excrement instead of honey, we 
may find it merely stupid rather than laughable, because it would have been easy 
to test the food before eating. In Joubert’s words, although people who are easily 
deceived often cause laughter, such credulity may also cause mere annoyance 
or even anger, since the ridiculous situation could easily have been avoided had 
the person exercised even a modicum of caution. Joubert notes that laughable 
action may also lose its charm if it takes place at an improper time or if we have 
encountered similar occurrences so often that they merely tire us.40
People who wished to have full command of their reason and to live life 
undisturbed often resisted laughter. Laughter as an expression of uncontrolled 
emotion implied that the person laughing had abandoned himself to the senses, 
to outer impulses and circumstances, something the Stoics especially wanted to 
avoid. The opposition between the intellectual or virtuous life and the sensual life 
also plays a role here, since laughter was thought to be evoked by pleasure and 
to express passion. For the intellectuals mentioned above, laughter was not a sign 
of the good life but signalled weakness of will or lack of discipline and was thus to 
be avoided. Laughter was also a matter of persuasion. Plutarch tells us that Cato 
Uticensis was reluctant to be persuaded about anything by anyone or to allow 
anything to be done to him. This explained, for example, his difficulties in learning, 
and before accepting anything or obeying his teacher he always demanded to know 
the reason.41 Thus, his suspicion and resistance to laughter were based on the fact 
that laughter was a reaction to the outer world and a sign that the laugher had 
been provoked and persuaded by someone else. Knowing the Stoic predilection 
for self-sufficiency, tranquillity and constancy of mind, Cato’s resistance to laughter 
can easily be read as a sign of the power of his will to avoid such emotions and 
39 Joubert 1980, 121–122.
40 Joubert 1980, 20–22, 25–26.
41 Plutarch, Cato the Younger 1, 4.
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reactions. He may have felt like laughing but did not, because laughing would have 
meant surrendering his rational control. In Stoic terms, he did not resist laughter as 
such but took command of his own immediate reactions, emotions and impulses 
offered to him by the outer world. A famous dictum in Horace’s Ars poetica says: 
“When a person laughs, people’s faces smile in return” (101). This sympathetic 
reaction happened automatically; for the same reason it was resisted by the Stoics, 
who insisted that everything should be subjected to the command of reason. All the 
agelasts were significantly solitary figures.
However, the absence of laughter could also be explained through physiology. 
In Joubert’s view even the Stoic apatheia was a natural condition. He referred 
to Pliny’s passage 7, 79, which pointed out that most authors of wisdom and 
founders of philosophical schools (Diogenes, Pyrrho, Heraclitus and Timon the 
Misanthrope, who refused to communicate with people)42 were naturally so afflicted 
that they were exempt from all passion. In Joubert’s estimation the philosophers’ 
self-restraint and tranquillity were not states of mind achieved through mental 
exercise, but rather natural inclinations based on a melancholic character and 
bodily constitution. Joubert continues: “For those who are reduced to the apathy of 
the Stoics, empty of all joy, are in no way tempted by laughable things. And this is 
because they are not moved by any emotion of the spirits, having hearts that are 
neither soft nor agile, but hard and stiff by nature.”43 Although some people may 
intentionally arrive at a stiffness that is less prone to laughter, more often than not 
this condition results from a natural insensitivity based on the physical structure 
of the heart: hard, stiff and small hearts dilate only with difficulty and are far less 
easily moved than soft, agile and large hearts. Humoral pathology also still played 
some role here, since sanguine people (women more than men, fat people more 
than skinny) and those who radiated heat were, through their natural constitutions, 
more inclined to laughter. For the same reason wine was thought to be conducive 
to happiness, since from wine came good blood, which took away all sadness 
and unhappiness.44 Joubert claimed that “those who give themselves completely 
to study and contemplation, or to some great enterprise, are almost all agelasts, 
sad, rude, severe, and have knitted brows, because the vital strength having been 
weakened by the consumption of spirits, they have little blood left, and that little is as 
coarse as the atrabilious kind.”45 That is to say, people without any sense of humour 
concretely lacked humour. These arguments illuminate how deeply Renaissance 
authors were at pains to explain laughter through physiology and how Joubert, 
42 On Timon’s misanthropy, see Ménager 1995, 81–83.
43 Joubert 1980, 104; trans. David de Rocher.
44 Joubert 1980, 101–105.
45 Joubert 1980, 104; trans. David de Rocher.
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the medical doctor, interpreted the human habit from a medical perspective. The 
inclination to certain emotions was based on the bodily constitution.
Joubert mentioned two further reasons that stopped laughter: either one did 
not perceive laughable action or did not grasp it. When the mind was occupied by 
worries or a sharp pain, attention was turned away from laughable action. Joubert 
noted that if a bothersome worry hammers the brain, “in vain will something funny 
be presented to sad, grave, and severe Cato, to Heraclitus the weeper, and similar 
sour-faces.”46 Joubert thus explained the absence of laughter in these men by their 
sad, serious or melancholic character: “[Melancholics] scarcely concern themselves 
with other than serious things, take no pleasure in ridiculous ones, and are not 
moved by them.”47 Laughter was also deliberately avoided, since it turned serious 
people away from more important pursuits, hard work and intellectual endeavours. 
Then there were those who paid no attention to ridiculous things because of their 
absent-mindedness; this group of people included the dreamers, the abashed, the 
fearful, the suspicious and those suffering from deep love or madness.48
Juan Luis Vives also dealt briefly with laughter in his De anima et vita. In his 
view, people having serious intellectual or spiritual tasks were less prone to laughter. 
Vives argued that intellectuals rarely laughed, and only smiled rather knowingly. He 
gave several reasons for this. First, they were occupied by important issues, serious 
thinking and intense contemplation. Second, they were often melancholic and had 
stiff hearts. Third, sometimes decorum prevented them from laughing, since an open 
display of emotions and unbridled laughter were considered improper and vulgar. 
Fourth, because of their prudence, few things were new, sudden and surprising 
enough to provoke amusement.49 If laughter arose from novel joy or delight, as 
Vives argues, then intellectuals and philosophers were not likely to laugh as often 
as children, women or uneducated rustics, since fewer things were unexpected or 
unforeseen by their sharp and thoughtful minds.50 Vives also suggested that laughter 
should be harnessed through self-discipline. In the early modern period, the new 
46 Joubert 1980, 26; trans. David de Rocher.
47 Joubert 1980, 101; trans. David de Rocher. On intellectuals’ melancholy, see Rütten 1992, with 
further references.
48 Joubert 1980, 101.
49 Vives 1959 (1538), 202–204. 
50 Joubert and Fracastoro emphasised that the sense of surprise was essential to laughter and 
delight. Things which evoke laughter were new, sudden, light and ridiculous, and these caused 
admiration (admiratio) and joy in people. Cf. Fracastoro 1550, 182–183. This so-called incongruence 
theory of laughter was later developed by Kant and Schopenhauer; see Morreall 1987.
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standards of bodily control demanded that the elite differentiated themselves from 
their inferiors, that is to say, the ignorant, the peasants, children and women.51
But a grim face was also an advantage for intellectuals. The seventeenth-
century Jesuit and satirist Jakob Balde (1604–1668) noted in his long satirical 
poem Vultuosae torvitatis encomium (In praise of grim faces) the great benefits of 
looking severe and even ugly. He argued that intellectuals were much happier if 
they looked ugly – as they usually did – because they had probably devoted their 
lives to true wisdom and learning. An ugly face protected them from selfishness, 
self-love and sensual pleasures, and thus allowed them to search for true beauty. 
A grim face thus signalled a virtuous life – and made it possible.52
Exceeding the Proper Mean: Dying of 
Laughter and Mad Laughter
But if the happy life is a virtuous life and only the virtuous are happy, does a 
virtuous life necessarily need to be serious? Diepelius reminded his audience that 
many serious and virtuous men had given a prominent place to laughter: Plato’s 
philosophy and even Aristotle’s works were full of wit and laughter. Diepelius’ 
question whether laughter should be allowed was answered by Philipp Matthaeus 
(1554–1603), a professor at Marburg University, an institution that specialised in 
the learned treatment of laughter in the early modern period.53 In his Responsio, 
Matthaeus noted that there have always been people who have voluntarily refused 
to laugh or who have lost this ability because of some frightening incident. However, 
Matthaeus criticised both excessive laughter as well as the complete resistance to 
laughter. He based his argument on theological, ethical and physiological grounds, 
calling upon God as his witness to defend laughter. God had given human beings 
the ability to feel moderate joy and therefore also a licence to laugh, which signalled 
joy. Matthaeus argued that God specifically did not require insensibility (apatheia) 
from human beings but moderation of the emotions (metriopatheia) and that God 
also expected humans to feel the joy in good things. Among those who exceeded 
the proper mean, early modern authors mentioned the following:54
51 Cf. Fracastoro 1550, 188, where he argues that children, women and the common folk are more 
prone to wonder and amusement and therefore also to laughter, whereas men and philosophers are 
more serious-minded. Also drunkenness, social occasions and celebrations provoke laughter.
52 Balde 1660; cf. Baier 2005, 253.
53 Verberckmoes 2000, 401.
54 See Matthaeus 1582, 766; Joubert 1980, 41, 131–133; Ravisius Textor 1595, 300–301. 
Johannes Ravisius Textor (1480–1524) was a French humanist. His main work Officina was a 
popular encyclopaedia which included anecdotes and strange facts of every kind. Joubert, for his 
part, devoted one chapter to the issue of “Whether or not someone can die of laughter,” the very 
chapter that concluded his treatise. To be precise, Joubert talks about joy, Ravisius Textor about joy 
and laughter (Gaudio et risu mortui).
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Democritus: ca. 460–370 BC, the famous ever-laughing philosopher.• 55
Chilon of Sparta: ca. 550 BC, a famous Spartan who died of happiness • 
upon seeing his son come in triumph from the Olympic games.
Zeuxis: 435–390 BC, a famous Greek painter who died laughing at a portrait • 
of an old woman he had just depicted.56
Sophocles and Dionysius the Tyrant of Sicily both died of joy when they • 
heard news of their victories in tragedies .57
Philippides: ca. 300 BC, an Athenian comic poet who died after unexpectedly • 
winning the prize in a literary contest.
Xenophantus: a man who, according to Aristotle’s • Nicomachean ethics 
(1150b10), attempted to suppress his laughter but failed and burst into a 
violent explosion of mad laughter.
Chrysippus of Soli: ca. 280–207 BC, another Greek and Stoic philosopher, • 
who died laughing at the sight of his donkey after it had eaten all his figs and 
washed them down with the wine offered by its master’s servant.58
Of these examples, Democritus is of course the most famous. He laughed 
regularly and, in Joubert’s estimation, lived for 109 years, dissatisfied with nothing.59 
Joubert thus inferred that laughter counteracted old age. Democritus’ laughter 
had a serious point, since he laughed at the folly of humankind. In addition to 
excessive and continuous laughter, another way to exceed the proper mean was to 
die laughing.60 As for Chrysippus’ death, a similar donkey story was told by Joubert 
when explaining a special type of laughter called Catonian. Catonian laughter was 
“extremely inordinate and shuddering”. It had been named for Cato the Censor, 
who laughed only once in his life at the sight of a thistle-eating ass.61 Also, mothers 
55 There is an extensive literature on Democritus; see, e.g., Rütten 1992.
56 The Zeuxis anecdote was told by Festus, De verborum significatione, s.v. pictor: Pictor Zeuxis 
risu mortuus, dum ridet effuse pictam a se anum. Cf. Ménager 1995, 28–30 (on Zeuxis and Philemon 
in Rabelais).
57 Cf. Pliny, Naturalis historia 7, 180: “Cases of people who died of joy are (besides Chilo - - ) 
Sophocles and Dionysius the tyrant of Sicily, in both cases after receiving news of a victory with a 
tragedy” (trans. H. Rackham). The anecdote about Sophocles’ death was also related by Valerius 
Maximus, Facta et dicta memorabilia 9, 12, ext. 5.
58 This anecdote was also related by Diogenes Laertius 7, 185. Joubert also mentioned the 
anecdote of the ass and the figs when discussing Philemon.
59 Joubert 1980, 17.
60 Several Renaissance treatises on laughter also noted its negative effects on the human body 
and the occasional deaths resulting from it. On such treatises, see Ordine 2000, 540–541 (esp. 
notes 52 and 54).
61 Joubert 1980, 90.
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had died of relief on seeing their sons return safely from battle, and people in 
Joubert’s time had expired at sudden sad or happy news.62
However, according to Joubert these deaths were caused by a sudden joy 
rather than laughter. In his treatise Joubert examined the physiological reasons 
and differences caused in the body by these two emotions. One could die of 
sudden joy but usually laughter did not have such dramatic effects. Joy dissipated 
a great quantity of humours and blood in all directions throughout the body. In 
laughter this movement and a widening of the heart was never as excessive as 
in extreme joy, because there always remained enough blood in the heart to 
sustain life. Joubert claims that since laughter is caused by the mixed feelings of 
joy and sadness, the latter emotion prevents the effects of laughter from becoming 
excessive. Therefore, laughter usually did not cause death, whereas in joy the 
heart dilated rapidly and the sudden, great loss of humours was the main reason 
people died of this emotion, especially those with weak hearts. Death was likely if 
the heart was already weakened by ardent study, assiduous cogitation and neglect 
of nourishment, which together caused a great loss of humours and a general 
failure of bodily strength. For Joubert, the chief cause of death from laughter was 
not the sudden movement of humours in the heart, but lack of respiration.63
Laughter, Jubilation and Religion
One case still remains to be discussed, since sixteenth-century authors also placed 
Christ among the agelast figures. The argument that, according to the Gospels, 
Christ wept but never laughed or smiled was the subject of numerous theological 
discussions from the Middle Ages to the seventeenth century.64 Christ was capable 
of laughing as are all human beings, but by denying himself what was natural to 
man – a sense of humour – he emphasised the seriousness of his task of bringing 
salvation to humanity. His refusal to laugh has also been explained by saying that 
the Gospels do not include everything he did, or that since laughter was considered 
62 Joubert 1980, 41; Ravisius Textor 1595, 300–301. A similar list of women who died of good news 
was given by Valerius Maximus, Facta et dicta memorabilia 9, 12, 2–3; and Pliny, Naturalis historia 
7, 180.
63 Joubert 1980, 43–44, 61–62 and 95. 
64 On laughter and religion, see Moretti 2001; Sanders 1995, 35–57, 127–164 (for Christ, see 
esp. 135–141); Minois 2000, 95–134; Screech 1999; Ménager 1995, 117–148; and briefly Berger 
1997, 197–204 and Verberckmoes 2003, 3–4. Laughter was mentioned in the Bible on several 
occasions. Ninety-year-old Sarah laughed in disbelief when she was told that she would give birth 
to Isaac – who embodied laughter – and to a whole new nation (Gen. 17:17; 18:12–15; 21). God 
laughed in the Old Testament four times (in Psalms 2:4; 37:13; 59:9; Proverbs 1:26) to ridicule 
sinners’ vain ambitions and to remind them that they amounted to nothing in the face of his power. 
Laughter was also mentioned when Christ was mocked at his crucifixion. Early modern discussions 
of laughter often listed the conventional examples of people laughing in the Bible, including St. Paul, 
who advised everyone to rejoice with others. See, e.g., Diepelius 1582, 765.
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random or malicious, it was avoided by Christ.65 Matthaeus claimed that if Christ 
did not laugh, it was merely because laughter was too trivial to merit inclusion in the 
Gospels. Moreover, the Bible did not deal with everything that Christ did. On the 
other hand, Christ did not come to earth seeking pleasure. Matthaeus concluded 
that Christ did not reject all sorts of laughter but only excessive measures and 
epikhairekakian (malignant joy).66 Puteanus, for his part, justified laughter as being 
acceptable on the basis of the angel’s announcement to the shepherds at Christ’s 
birth: a great joy for all people, a joy that lifted people’s hearts and spirits. Thus 
laughter became a sign of true, heavenly and evangelical joy originating in God.67 
The religious background was important for discussions of laughter, and 
patristic literature, for example, often touched upon this issue. To summarise this 
discussion very briefly, laughter was at times totally rejected for the reason that 
Christ did not laugh even once during his life on earth; at other times mankind was 
only advised to keep laughter to its proper proportion. Clement of Alexandria (ca. 
150–215 AD), for example, distinguished different types of laughter and rejected 
uncontrolled, explosive laughter and giggling as the laughter of whores. The type 
of laughter he accepted was smiling, “the laughter of the wise”, which was a kind 
of relaxation of tension and harmony. He also favoured the Greek hero Ajax, who 
was said to have gone into battle with “a smile on his grim face.” St. Basil rejected 
loud laughter and shaking of the body but accepted mild laughter (lenis risus).68 In 
Renaissance art especially the smile came to express harmony and happiness, 
whereas loud laughter, open mouths, protruding tongues and visible teeth were 
more ambivalent and often related to visual depictions of death, the devil or evil 
and malicious laughter.69
Laughter was also shown in connection to Christ’s ascension and redemption, 
and this particular holy shouting of joy was parodied in Renaissance literature. 
For example, Epistolae obscurorum virorum, a famous satire on stylistic vices, 
scholasticism and corrupted Catholics from the early sixteenth century, includes 
a passage that describes a successful homily on the subject of shouting for joy; 
the title of the sermon is “God is gone up with a shout” (Deus ascendit cum 
jubilatione). The topic of hilarious noise is elaborated upon here with random 
quotations from the Bible:
65 Puteanus 1612, 779. See also Verberckmoes 2000, 406.
66 Matthaeus 1582, 766.
67 For this passage in Puteanus, see also Verberckmoes 2000, 406–407.
68 Barasch 1997, 183–184; the passage is also quoted via Stobaeus in Dornau 1995, 780. 
69 Barasch 1997, 194–201.
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[…] when the Lord ascended on high with uplifted hands, then the apostles with the 
Blessed Virgin stood and shouted until they were hoarse, that it might be fulfilled which 
was spoken by the prophet, “I am weary of crying and my throat is dry.” […] this outcry 
was a shout of joy, and furthermore necessary for the Catholic faith, as saith the Lord 
in the Evangel, “Verily, verily I say unto you, if these should hold their peace, the stones 
would cry out.” They all shouted with rapture and great zeal – especially St. Peter, who 
had a voice like a sackbut – as David witnesseth, “This poor man cried.” The Blessed 
Virgin shouted not, but praised God in her heart […]. And while the Apostles thus 
shouted together with jubilation and devotion, an angel came from heaven and said 
unto them, “Ye men of Galilee, why stand ye here shouting, and gazing into heaven?” 
[…] (I, 30; trans. Francis Griffin Stokes)
This parodic passage increases the acoustical effect of the words by amplifying 
the topic of shouting for joy until the voice turns to mere quantitative expansion, 
which consists of inarticulate sounds and is thus devoid of any significance. Here 
parody serves religious satire, since the preacher who has given this mindless 
sermon – probably preaching in a loud voice – is Catholic, whereas the book is 
anti-Catholic. Parody also works here against mysticism and spiritual union, and 
speaks for rational and articulate speech.70
Laughter as a physical phenomenon was also bound up with the earthly and 
momentary nature of joy. Especially texts that celebrated intense joy defended 
earthly forms of laughter, i.e., laughter that was entirely based on joy felt in the 
finite and in the mundane. Such texts also made an anti-religious argument in 
emphasising the value of finite experiences and life. Religious views divided the joys 
into accidental and essential ones. Whereas the religious view of joy emphasised 
that only heavenly joy and the joys of the after-life were true, essential and lasting, 
worldly joy was seen as accidental, trivial and fleeting. In parody, however, these 
judgements were subverted. A good example was the short mock-disputation 
on jubilation, Disputatio de jubilatu (1621), which celebrated the loud and intense 
experience of joy that was entirely based on earthly pleasures, immoderate 
behaviour and intoxification.71 The text does not permit any glimpse of higher joy, 
thus marking an emphatic distance from Christian silence, gravity and sobriety.
70 For this text, see also Kivistö 2002.
71 Disputatio de jubilatu follows the usual disputation form and its devices of pedantry, listing, 
categorising and quoting authorities. For example, the striving for classification is parodied by 
making a difference between the subtypes of jubilation, which depend on the formation of the larynx 
and on the ease with which the air passes through it. The praeses of the thesis was Calliphonus 
Stentor, professor in the art of jubilation and the cantor with the sweetest voice, and the respondent 
was Hugo Cüsonius Landaviensis. Kalliphônos means someone with a fine voice; Stentôr was a 
Greek at Troy who was famous for his loud voice and described in the Iliad as having the voice of 
fifty men. In his dedication the author emphasised that the audience addressed did not consist of 
serious old people but of young men whose hearts abounded in joy.
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The anonymous author of the Disputatio began by studying the word “jubilation”, 
which meant a wild shout of joy that expressed exultation. It voiced happiness 
and joyful emotions that cannot be expressed verbally (such as divine joy, exultant 
inexpressible joy) but that cannot be hidden either.72 Here I will deal only briefly with 
the author’s classification of jubilating people. These included especially younger 
people, students and craftsmen, whereas angels, animals and dead people do not 
jubilate – although some animal voices do coincidentally resemble jubilation. At 
times lifeless objects such as mountains or the earth can jubilate metaphorically 
(Psalms 98:4, 8; 100:1; Isaiah 44:23; 49:13). In addition, the poor, melancholics and 
monks belonging to mendicant orders and mutes do not jubilate. A mute is here 
defined as someone whose throat muscles were mutilated and whose tongue was 
so thick that it protruded from the mouth and prevented him from laughing. People 
who jubilate in an imperfect manner due to some physical injury also include those 
who lisp, old people and decrepit men who have lost some or all of their teeth. 
As for gender differences in the expression of jubilation, in general, very generous 
body language, clapping hands or stamping feet, was not permitted among either 
the intellectual elite or women, since these actions were associated with uncivilised 
customs.73 Likewise, loud laughter and strong gesticulation were not considered 
suitable for women, since these behaviours left a grotesque and shameless 
impression. The idealised view of women depicted them as sweetly smiling. A 
feminine smile implied a self-restrained, discreet and even enigmatic character; it 
connoted chastity that was not prone to any excessive pleasures. Also important 
here is silence: a smile is the silent and serene laughter suitable to women, and 
while being a restrained and controlled expression of joy, it was also considered 
the opposite of raucous merriment. Both angels and chaste women were depicted 
as quietly smiling, an image that reflected their divine quality, celestial harmony and 
inner superiority.74
72 The Latin nouns jubilus, jubilum, jubilatio and jubilatus appeared especially in Christian writers 
(with the meaning of “to shout for joy”). Jubilant joy was expressed by making a joyful noise, uttering 
loud sounds of joy, and rejoicing with songs and acclamations, all of which expressed that the joy 
was exultant. It was often accompanied by violent movement, shaking and trembling. Especially 
Augustine discussed the wordlessness of the jubilus, seeing jubilation as a symbol of a joy that 
surpasses the expression of ordinary speech. According to the dictionaries of later Latinity, this 
inarticulate sound was typical of pastoral and rural people who, for example, gave orders to their 
dogs by using this particular voice (cf. Apuleius, Metamorphoses 8, 17) or expressed their happiness 
in the abundance of harvest. It also had its origins in military language: a warcry was called jubilation 
and a loud bellow probably alerted others to one’s strength and ability to fight. According to Silius 
Italicus, the Cyclops delighted in the jubilations of the Siren (Punica 14, 475). It also had a specific 
meaning in medieval music: in Gregorian song jubilus referred to the long melisma on the last 
syllable of the word alleluia, and this long, non-meaningful aaaaa was called jubilus. Here jubilus 
also had an emotional content and represented an echo of the jubilant music of heaven. See Du 
Cange, s.v. Jubilus; OED, s. v. jubilant, jubilate; Georges, s.v. Iubilum; LTL, s.v. Jubilatio, Jubilum; 
DML, s.v. Jubilum; NGDM, s.v. jubilus.
73 Verberckmoes 2000, 400.
74 On smiling, see Ménager 1995, 187–222; Barasch 1997, 201–206.
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However, in the dissertation on jubilation, the author accords women a licence 
to loud laughter on the basis of both sexes being advised to express their innate 
joy equally. On the other hand, an idealistic view of girls’ laughter still pervades the 
text, because their joyful laughing differs significantly in quality from boys’ laughter. 
Girls have voices so sweet that when they jubilate they seem to breathe out roses 
(Hybleas rosas), honey (Cecropium mel) and all kinds of other fragrances (including 
poisonous ones). This image reminds one of those idealised literary women, from 
Sappho’s beloved (cf. Catullus, dulce ridentem) to Petrarch’s Laura, whose smile 
was always sweet (dolce), angelic and led one’s thoughts to paradise and celestial 
pleasures.75 Finally, the author announced the purpose of jubilation: to make an 
innate joy manifest and open, console the disturbed mind, fill it with joy and cure 
those suffering from chronic melancholy.
Final Remarks
In early modern texts on laughter both joy and happiness were seen in the face. 
People were thought to be happy when they laughed, but they did not necessarily 
laugh when they were happy. As a sign of momentary pleasure, laughter was 
also condemned and criticised even to the extent that some serious-minded men 
refrained entirely from laughing. Early modern texts included the names of men who 
by their refusal to laugh wished to show their command of reason over passion and 
their ability to abstain from the scornful derision inherent in all laughter. For these 
men, true joy and happiness were not attained through momentary pleasures, but 
only by means of a sober mind and virtuous living. Leaving aside sensual pleasures 
and desires and enjoying mere contemplation was a source for true, intense and 
profound joy. Laughter that was too effusive was especially disapproved of, both by 
ancient and Christian authors, and therefore in parodies of such texts its loudest 
and most intense form, jubilation, was defended to the full.
Juan Luis Vives observed that laughter was frequently and easily produced 
by wine-drinking, playing, loving, telling amusing stories, staging merry feasts in 
which the mind relaxed, and by the sudden sense of relief after having escaped 
from a great danger or worry, for example.76 This association with frivolity, bodily 
delights and entertainment was also one reason that the rigid moralists abstained 
from laughter and why they were mentioned in parodies and quodlibet discussions. 
University festivals celebrating the quodlibets gave a prominent place to laughter 
as a social phenomenon, as a reaction to someone telling a joke. Laughter was 
a form of merry exchange, a way of allowing someone to affect oneself. This was 
75 Ménager 1995, 192.
76 Vives 1959 (1538), 204.
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something that the Stoics as autonomous agents were not inclined to permit, and 
hence they became frequent objects of parody in texts dealing with laughter.77 
The resistance to laughter was criticised on the basis of the changed belief that 
real life was the opposite of rigidity and fixity. Especially on festive occasions 
laughter was emphatically understood as momentary, pleasurable, bodily, based 
on the senses, unbridled, a release from restraint and control, a phenomenon of 
the moment. In laughter “we are no longer in control of the moment” nor is there 
any “achievement of the will or imperative of character.”78 Early modern critics thus 
argued that the agelasts who rejected all emotions took life too seriously. But by 
spelling out the dangers of excessive joy they also reminded one that the preferred 
emotional attitude was moderate cheerfulness. Happy and healthy lives were lived 
in temperate gaiety which was life-conserving.
77 Sixteenth-century parodies often ignore the fact that the ancient Stoics favoured laughter that 
underscored seriousness. The Stoics attempted to correct the excesses, both of high seriousness 
and unbridled laughter, of others. See, e.g., Sanders 1995, 79–80, 114–115.
78 Kimmel 1998, 181–182.
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